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Foreword 
This paper represents one of the strategies I have used to achieve the learning objectives 
set out in my Plan of Study. The components of my Plan of Study are: Aboriginal law, Canadian 
climate change policy and legislation, and Interrelationships between climate change and 
aboriginal people. While my research on this paper did certainly enhance my learning within all 
of these components, the ultimate question was mainly focused on the last component – 
Interrelationships between climate change and aboriginal people. One of the main objectives 
under this component was to learn about how aboriginal law can affect how governments create 
policies or legislation concerning climate change so that I can determine whether there are gains 
to be made in both reconciliation and climate change mitigation. This paper explores one 
application of that question. The broader aim of this paper was to provide an example of how 
reconciliation and climate change mitigation can work together to produce mutual gains. 
Specifically, I sought to determine whether there is a legal obligation on the Crown to ensure 
reconciliation and climate change mitigation work together in the context of Ontario’s proposed 
cap-and-trade legislation and regulations. This work is a capsule of my entire Plan of Study.  
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Abstract 
The Government of Ontario has announced that it will join the Western Climate 
Initiative’s cap-and-trade program, with the first compliance period starting as soon as January 1, 
2017. The program will include the use of carbon offsets and establish an offset registry. This 
paper examines the question of whether Ontario’s treaties with First Nations in Northern Ontario 
create a right to ownership and control of carbon offsets situated on traditional territories. First, I 
discuss the cap-and-trade regime as a whole, and the criteria for carbon offsets specifically. Then 
I explore some of the overarching obligations of the Crown in relation to aboriginal communities 
generally and the more specific rights of First Nations communities in Northern Ontario. Finally, 
I provide three arguments that First Nations could use to assert a right to a sui generis ownership 
of the carbon sequestration capabilities of their traditional territories. The first argument relies on 
an incidental right to the enumerated treaty rights, the second is framed as a right to harvest 
carbon offsets, and the third deals with the expansion of the interpretation of the treaties to 
include sharing in the benefits of the land. Though tenuous, these arguments provide some tools 
for First Nations to use in negotiations with the Crown during the development of offset 
protocols and regulations surrounding the offset market.   
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I. Introduction 
The Ontario government has recently set out a vision for how it will help to combat 
climate change. The Climate Change Strategy Report sets out the province’s target of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of 80 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050, with mid-
term targets of 15 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and 37 per cent below 1990 levels by 
2030.1 In discussing the strategy for how Ontario will get to its mid-term target in 2030, the 
report states that Ontario will “work with First Nations and Metis communities to help 
implement the climate change strategy and to inform development of the action plan”2. It goes on 
to state: 
Our strategy recognizes that impacts of climate change are keenly felt in First 
Nations and Métis communities. We will work in partnership to address the 
challenges, and to develop a greater understanding of the key role First Nations 
and Métis communities can play in advancing our broader climate change 
approach using traditional knowledge, while recognizing the sovereignty and 
autonomy of First Nations and Métis communities. 3 
This indicates the provincial government’s awareness of the need to collaborate with aboriginal 
communities in Ontario while planning and implementing its greenhouse gas reduction 
strategies.  
 The Strategy Report also confirmed the April 2015 announcement4 that Ontario will join 
the cap-and-trade system under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), partnering with Quebec 
and California. The first compliance period is set to start in 2017, with the cap in line with the 
                                                          
1 Government of Ontario, “Climate Change Strategy Report 2015” online: <http://www.ontario.ca/page/climate-
change-strategy>. 
2 Ibid at 21. 
3 Ibid at 21. 
4 Government of Ontario, Office of the Premier, “Cap and Trade System to Limit Greenhouse Gas Pollution in 
Ontario” 13 April 2015, online: <https://news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2015/04/cap-and-trade-system-to-limit-greenhouse-
gas-pollution-in-ontario.html>. 
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best estimate of emissions in that year, and declining at a rate that would ensure that the province 
achieves its 2020 emissions reduction target.5 
My paper will explore one of the ways that aboriginal law and climate change law can be 
integrated such that there are benefits for both reconciliation with aboriginal people and climate 
change mitigation. I will use the example of a cap-and-trade system in Ontario to explore 
whether the law provides aboriginal communities in Northern Ontario with a right to the use and 
control of carbon sinks on their traditional territories for offset credits. First I will examine cap-
and-trade and the possible offset projects that aboriginal communities could put in place on their 
traditional territory in a way that is consistent with the exercise of aboriginal cultures in Ontario, 
such as in forests, peat bogs, and plant rich ecosystems. Because I am using Ontario as the 
jurisdiction guiding my research, I will need to consider the effects of existing treaties and the 
current dialogue surrounding these treaties. I will use the example of Treaty 9 when necessary 
because it covers the majority of Northern Ontario. 
This topic is important because Ontario is currently designing a cap-and-trade system that 
will incorporate carbon offsets, and the extent to which the government is integrating aboriginal 
law into their system is unclear. The cap-and-trade mechanism must be designed to be 
compatible with any historic, current and future aboriginal rights to carbon sinks. In her 
mandates to her ministers, Premier Kathleen Wynne has emphasized both the importance of 
climate change action and the well-being of aboriginal communities.6 Ontario’s climate change 
                                                          
5 Climate Change Strategy Report, supra note 1. 
6 Don Richardson, “Premier Wynne’s Priorities for Ontario: Aboriginal Community Wellbeing” 26 September 2014, 
Shared Value Solutions, online: <http://info.sharedvaluesolutions.com/blog/premier-wynne%E2%80%99s-
priorities-for-ontario-aboriginal-community-wellbeing>; 
Government of Ontario, “2014 Mandate letter: Environment and Climate Change”, online: 
<https://www.ontario.ca/page/2014-mandate-letter-environment-and-climate-change>; Government of Ontario, 
“2014 Mandate letter: Aboriginal Affairs”, online: <https://www.ontario.ca/page/2014-mandate-letter-aboriginal-
affairs>. 
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discussion paper of 2015 made it clear that it plans to “engage First Nations and Metis 
communities across Ontario in a focused conversation to work together to address climate 
impacts and climate change.” It is important to hold the government to this commitment and 
explicitly recognize the rights and obligations of aboriginal communities and the crown in this 
context. Furthermore, this will provide an example of how reconciliation and climate change 
mitigation can work together to achieve outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts. 
The specific research question is whether the treaties create a right to ownership and 
control of carbon sequestration projects on First Nations’ traditional territories within the 
proposed cap-and-trade regulation in Ontario. Would this be consistent with the current 
jurisprudence on treaty rights? Can carbon sinks be conceptualized such that they would fit into 
the test set out by the jurisprudence?  
As an introduction, I will briefly note the relevant principles of aboriginal law and cap-
and-trade regimes, and then review some of the literature that has integrated the two. 
Aboriginal communities have a special relationship with the Crown that creates rights 
and obligations for both parties. The principle of the honour of the Crown requires that the 
Crown act honourably in all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, “from the assertion of 
sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties”.7 The amendment of 
the Constitution in 1982 recognized and affirmed the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada.8 In the Ontario context, the most relevant are treaty rights which 
are defined in negotiated agreements between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. Older treaties 
are to be given a large and liberal interpretation, with ambiguities in wording resolved in favour 
                                                          
7 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forest), 2004 SCC 73 at para 17 [Haida]. 
8 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11, s 35(1). 
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of the Aboriginal party, and limitations restricting rights narrowly construed.9 Aboriginal and 
treaty rights can be infringed by the Crown in certain circumstances.10  
A cap-and-trade system constrains the total amount of emissions of regulated sources by 
creating a limited number of tradeable emission allowances. The most important requirement of 
a cap-and-trade system is that the cap on emissions must be sufficiently tight to create a real 
demand for emission allowances.11 The tighter the supply of emissions allowances, the higher 
the market price, and the greater the incentive to invest in abatement technology.12 Cost 
uncertainty based on unexpectedly high or volatile allowance prices can undermine political 
support for climate policy, make business planning difficult, and discourage investment in new 
technologies.13 This concern has led to incorporating "cost-containment" measures, such as 
offsets, allowance banking and borrowing, and safety valves.14 For the purpose of this paper, I 
will focus on carbon offsets. 
Most emissions trading systems allow regulated entities to use credits purchased from 
offset projects to meet their commitments.15 The specific rules regarding offsets vary widely 
between systems. There has been some debate over the legitimacy of the offset market, 
especially with respect to the quality and integrity of greenhouse gas offsets, along with worry 
over the appropriateness of buying “indulgences” to absolve carbon guilt.16 Rigorous screening 
                                                          
9 R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at para 41 [Badger]; Marshall v Canada [1999] 3 SCR 456 [Marshall I]. 
10 See for example, R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow]. 
11 Christie J Kneteman, "Building an Effective North American Emissions Trading System: Key Consideration and 
Canada's Role" (2010) 20 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 127. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Joseph E Aldy & Robert Stavins, "The Problems and Promise of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience" (2011) 
NBER Working Paper No 17569 at 6; Gilbert E Metcalf, “A Proposal for a US Carbon Tax Swap: An Equitable Tax 
Reform to Address Global Climate Change” (2007) Discussion Paper: The Hamilton Project at 26. 
14 Aldy, ibid at 6.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Steven Bernstein et al, "A Tale of Two Copenhagens: Carbon Markets and Climate Governance" (2010) 39(1) 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 161 at 169. 
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of offsets is expensive and diminishes potential cost savings created by offsets.17 The alternative 
view is that offsets add a necessary flexibility mechanism and also allow for innovation in 
unregulated sectors.18 I will explore whether offset systems have the added benefit of including 
aboriginal communities in the cap-and-trade program in a way that is mutually beneficial. The 
Ontario cap-and-trade system will include offsets echoing that of the other jurisdictions that 
make up the WCI – currently California and Quebec.19  For example, Quebec allows the use of 
offsets to a maximum of 8% of compliance, in projects such as manure storage facilities, waste 
disposal sites, and ozone-depleting substances projects.20 Projects must take place in California 
or Quebec to qualify as an offset in Quebec’s system.21 
In 2006, the Centre for Indigenous Environmental Resources prepared a report for the 
Assembly of First Nations called, “Legal Review of First Nations’ Rights to Carbon Credits”.22 
The review focused broadly on three possibilities. The first is through the claim that carbon as a 
resource was not ceded by First Nations to the Crown specifically, and thus ownership and rights 
of use still lie with the First Nations. The second is ownership and use of carbon through the 
exercise of territorial jurisdiction through settled land claims, on-reserve use, and aboriginal title. 
The third is ownership and use of carbon through the exercise of aboriginal and treaty rights. The 
legal arguments assert First Nation’s jurisdiction to environmental management in territories that 
can be used as carbon sinks, thus enabling First Nations to claim and sell offset credits. In the 
                                                          
17 Richard G Newell, William A Pizer & Daniel Raimi, “Carbon Markets 15 Years after Kyoto: Lessons Learned, 
New Challenges” (2013) 27(1) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 123. 
18 Kneteman, supra note 11. 
19 Ontario Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, “Cap and Trade Program Design Options” November 
2015, online: <http://www.downloads.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2015/012-5666_Options.pdf>. 
20 Canada's Ecofiscal Commission, "The Way Forward: A Practical Approach to Reducing Canada's Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions" (April 2015), online: <http://ecofiscal.ca/reports/wayforward/> at 39. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Centre for Indigenous Environmental Resources and the Assembly of First Nations, 2006. “Legal Review of First 
Nations’ Rights to Carbon Credits” 2006, online: <http://www.yourcier.org/uploads/2/5/6/1/25611440/report_6_-
_legal_review_of_first_nations_rights_to_carbon_credits.pdf>.  
9 
 
context of Ontario, where the argument would need to be framed in terms of aboriginal or treaty 
rights, the authors argue that claims can be made through rights to sustainable forest practices 
that are conducive to claiming, owning and selling carbon offset credits.  
In the first argument, interests in carbon are likened to rights to water, which are asserted 
to not have been specifically ceded by First Nations through treaty, and therefore an argument 
can be made that ownership still resides with First Nations.23 However, the authors discuss this 
in the context of reserve land, and therefore wouldn’t apply to all of the First Nation’s traditional 
territories. In the second argument, the authors suggest that in areas controlled by First Nations 
governance structures under settled land claims agreements, on reserves, and off-reserve through 
assertion of Aboriginal title, forests and other areas can be managed and conserved in a way that 
is compatible with the creation of carbon offset credits.24 First Nations are free to use these lands 
towards the benefit of its members as long as the land is not used in a way that is irreconcilable 
with the Aboriginal use for which it was claimed. Again, this argument relies on a very small 
portion of the land in Ontario being available for First Nations use as carbon sinks. Finally, with 
respect to aboriginal rights, the authors suggest that a First Nation might be able to demonstrate 
that the traditional use of trees directed toward a common end, community health and well-being, 
could be extended to rights to store carbon in a way that would result in economic benefit for the 
community.25 An alternative that was also mentioned was the right to environmental 
management and conservation. Exercising these rights would result in “engaging in activities 
necessary to assert ownership over resulting carbon offset credits for the reduction of greenhouse 
gases,”26 enabling the First Nation to sell the credits under an offset system. Finally, good 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at 9. 
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conservation practices and forest management could be said to be incidental to the exercise of 
other protected aboriginal rights, such as hunting.27 Within the discussion of treaty rights, the 
authors stated that the treaties contemplated the guarantee of necessary conditions for the 
continued exercise of the treaty rights. They suggest that there would be a need to incorporate 
First Nation’s perspectives into how the territory should be managed in order for them to 
continue to exercise their treaty rights, and that this consultation could lead to the creation of 
carbon offset credits that would then be used and sold for the benefit of the First Nation.28 The 
arguments put forth in this report were preliminary and require further examination. In particular, 
this final argument based on exercising treaty rights within a First Nation’s traditional territory is 
under-developed. The authors state that  
the territory ceded by treaty still must be maintained in a way that is compatible 
with the exercise of First Nations’ treaty right; any government action to the 
contrary requires satisfaction of a duty to consult and accommodate. This 
implies the need to incorporate First Nations’ perspectives on how the territory 
should be managed in order for them to be able to continue to exercise their 
rights. Since these perspectives would likely correlate with conservation 
initiative and forest management measures that also increase the territory’s use 
as a carbon sink, a First Nation’s role in practices towards that end could result 
in obtaining carbon offset credits that could then be used and sole for the benefit 
of the first Nation” (emphasis added).29  
This argument results in a very weak conclusion. It seems to rely on the goodwill of the 
provincial government, not on legal grounds. I will attempt to strengthen the argument for a 
treaty right to ownership of carbon offset credits within a First Nations’ traditional territory.  
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid at 11-12. 
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II. Cap-and-Trade and the Offset Market 
A. Principles of Cap-and-Trade 
In this section I will examine cap-and-trade generally, and then the possibilities for an 
offset market more specifically. A cap-and-trade system constrains the total amount of emissions 
of regulated sources by creating a limited number of tradeable emission allowances. The 
efficiency created by this kind of system is that the firms that have a low cost of compliance will 
do so first, trading their extra credits with those who would have a higher cost of compliance. 
This way, allowances are put their highest-value use -- covering the emissions that are the most 
costly to reduce, and providing incentive for the least costly reductions.30 
This system is more complicated than a straight carbon tax. Policy makers will need to 
decide on how many allowances to issue, the scope of the cap's coverage, including whether to 
regulate based on the sale of fuels or based on monitored emissions (upstream or downstream 
emissions), how do distribute allowances, which “cost containment measures” to include, and 
how to regulate offsets. Furthermore, it requires the creation of a complex and costly trading 
sector. 
The most important requirement of a cap-and-trade system is that the cap on emissions 
must be sufficiently tight to create a real demand for emission allowances.31 The tighter the 
supply of emissions allowances, the higher the market price, and the greater the incentive to 
invest in abatement technology.32 Even if there is a floor price in the trading scheme, and permits 
are actioned off, without a tight enough cap, the result would simply be a carbon tax that is too 
low to effect change.   
                                                          
30 Aldy, supra note 13 at 5.  
31 Kneteman, supra note 11. 
32 Ibid. 
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Cost uncertainty based on unexpectedly high or volatile allowance prices can undermine 
political support for climate policy, make business planning difficult, and discourage investment 
in new technologies.33 This concern has led to incorporating "cost-containment" measures, such 
as offsets, allowance banking and borrowing, and a safety valve.34  
Emission allowances can be either given away (known as "grandfathering") or auctioned 
off. Historically they have been given away to industry as part of a process to obtain support for 
the system.35 This practice has been criticized for a few reasons.36 Firstly, it is a loss of 
substantial revenues, which could be used to lower other taxes as well as for investment in clean 
technologies. Secondly, the free allocation of permits can undermine the goal of discouraging the 
consumption of carbon-intensive energy. Furthermore, it decreases transparency in the system.37 
Metcalf argues that a cap-and-trade scheme with grandfathered permits create windfalls that 
accrue to shareholders.38 This results in a regressive system, because equities are predominantly 
owned by wealthier households.39 A study modelling the welfare implications of different 
climate policies demonstrated that grandfathering creates significantly worse welfare outcomes 
compared to a system employing per-capita allocation of associated revenues.40 The allocation of 
permits also creates significantly more complexity in the design of the system. If allocations are 
based on historical emissions, benchmarking is required.41 
                                                          
33 Aldy, supra note 13 at 6; Metcalf, supra note 13 at 26. 
34 Aldy, ibid at 6.  
35 Metcalf, supra note 13. 
36 Ibid at 22. 
37 Kneteman, supra note 11. 
38 Metcalf, supra note 13 at 23. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Andrew J Leach, "The Welfare Implications of Climate Change Policy" (2009) 57 Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 151. 
41 Metcalf, supra note 13 at 24. 
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The free allocation of permits is argued to be a device that would reduce carbon leakage 
caused by firm relocations to other countries with less stringent emissions targets.42 One study 
has demonstrated through modelling that grandfathering can be an effective tool to discourage 
relocation in the long run, even when the practice is terminated in a finite amount of time.43 The 
authors suggest that the driving force behind this result are sunk investments into low-carbon 
technologies or emission-saving equipment that create a lock-in effect, preventing relocation 
even after phasing-out the free allocation of permits.  
Recently there has been a preference for auctioning off at least some of the permits 
within a system in order to send a clear price signal and to avoid charges of windfall profits.44 
This preference likely developed from lessons learned from the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) experience, where free allocation along with an over-allocation of 
permits led to a dramatic collapse in permit prices. It also allows for funds to be raised for 
recycling back into the system to offset consumer price increases or to invest in research. 
Another way to provide certainty over time is to allow the "banking" of emission credits 
between trading periods. This practice allows firms to reduce emissions below their allowance 
allotment in one year and then save, or "bank" the surplus allowances for use or trade in future 
years.45 This provides an incentive to make early reductions to smooth out the transition to more 
strict regulations in the future as the cap decreases.46 One of the problems with banking is that it 
can solidify any early mistakes in the supply of emissions credits.47 If there is an over-supply of 
                                                          
42 Robert C Schmidt & Jobst Heitzig, “Carbon Leakage: Grandfathering as an Incentive Device to Avert Firm 
Relocation” (2014) 67 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 209. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Matthew J Hoffman, “Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after 
Kyoto” (2011), Oxford Scholarship Online: Constructing Carbon Markets at 5. 
45 Metcalf, supra note 13. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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emission credits and banking is allowed, that miscalculation will affect subsequent periods of a 
trading scheme.48 Therefore, if banking is permitted, setting the appropriate emissions cap from 
the beginning becomes even more important. Furthermore, banking links expectations over time, 
so the price today depends on expected prices tomorrow. 49  
Most emissions trading systems allow regulated entities to use credits purchased from 
offset projects to meet their commitments.50 The specific rules regarding offsets vary widely 
between systems. For example, the EU ETS allows the use of CDM credits, although often 
limited to certain sectors or percentages of total emissions covered.51 The Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI), on the other hand, places specific limitation on the geographic locations 
where offset credits may be generated -- the majority of offsets must come from projects within 
the US.52 There has been some debate over the legitimacy of the offset market, with contestation 
over the quality and integrity of greenhouse gas offsets.53 There has been worry over whether 
emissions reductions projects are credible and the appropriateness of buying 'indulgences' to 
absolve carbon guilt.54 One of the problems often cited is that in unregulated countries, there is 
no baseline against which one can unequivocally prove that emissions are reduced.55 Even 
domestic offsets are subject to verification and leakage concerns -- especially for agricultural and 
forestry projects such as reforestation and manure methane capture.56 Rigorous screening of 
offsets creates transaction costs that eat into the potential cost savings.57 The alternative view is 
                                                          
48 Ibid. 
49 Newell, supra note 17. 
50 Hoffman, supra note 44. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Bernstein, supra note 16 at 169. 
54 Ibid. 
55 James W Coleman, "Unilateral Climate Regulation" (2013) online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237623>. 
56 Kneteman, supra note 11. 
57 Newell, supra note 17. 
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that offsets have value not just for the flexibility mechanism, but also the capacity to stimulate 
innovation and shifts in common practices in unregulated sectors.58 This would allow emission 
trading schemes with a narrow scope in terms of sectoral coverage to have a broader societal 
impact.59 
Safety valve provisions in cap-and-trade systems are one way to limit volatility in the 
price of emissions allocations. This allows firms to purchase an unlimited number of permits at a 
set price, therefore setting a ceiling on the price of allocations.60 If the market price for emissions 
allocations is below the safety-valve price, then firms will purchase allocations in the open 
market, but once allocation prices reach the safety valve price, firms will purchase any needed 
permits directly from the government.61 This effectively changes the system into a carbon tax 
once the price reaches a certain limit. While the safety valve increases certainty for businesses, it 
severely decreases the certainty in the amount of emissions reductions, which would have been 
one of the main benefits of the cap-and-trade system.  
Linkages between cap-and-trade systems will allow permits generated in one system to 
be sold and used for compliance in another system. This is beneficial because it allows for the 
reductions in emissions to occur in the most efficient way -- in the firms and locations where it is 
cheapest to do so. Linkages with other systems create improved market liquidity by combining 
many participants from varying sectors.62 Insufficient trading activity can lead to temporary 
shortages of emissions credits, which may scare regulators into raising the cap, or force emitters 
                                                          
58 Kneteman, supra note 11. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Metcalf, supra note 13 at 27. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Kneteman, supra note 11. 
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to undertake their own technological investments, leading to inefficiency.63 It is important that a 
linked cap-and-trade system has a similarly stringent cap across all partners and enforcement of 
those caps. Otherwise, there would be a powerful incentive to adopt a less stringent cap or under-
enforce its cap, which would, in effect, subsidize its own industries.64 This is one of the problems 
that occurred in the EU ETS. 
B. Lessons from other Jurisdictions 
The EU ETS adopted the downstream regulation approach and included large sources 
such as oil refineries, combustion installations over 20MWth, coke ovens, cement factories, 
ferrous metal production, glass and ceramics production, and pulp and paper production.65 The 
process for setting caps and allowances was initially decentralized to the EU member states. This 
created incentives for individual countries to overestimate their emissions to protect their 
economic competitiveness, resulting in an aggregate cap that exceeded the EU's business-as-
usual emissions. This led to a dramatic decrease in allowance prices. The volatility in the prices 
has been attributed to the absence of transparent, precise emissions data at the beginning of the 
program, a surplus of allowances, energy price volatility, and a program feature that prevented 
banking of allowances from the first phase to the second phase of the program.66 The system's 
cap was tightened for phase II (2008-2012) and its scope expanded to cover new sources. The 
price fell again by 2011 with the economic recession. Phase III is underway with a decreased 
                                                          
63 Ibid. 
64 Coleman, supra note 55. 
65 Aldy, supra note 13 at 10. 
66 Market Advisory Committee to the California Air Resources Board, "Recommendations for Designing a 
Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade System for California" (2007) online: 
<http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/market_advisory_committee/>. 
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cap, a larger share of the allowances subject to auctioning, tighter limits on offsets, and unlimited 
banking of allowances between Phases II and III.67 
RGGI is also a downstream cap-and-trade program, but it is limited in scope to the power 
sector. It is also unambitious in its emissions reduction objectives -- the ultimate goal is 10 
percent below 2009 emissions.68 Some issues with this program have been noted: leakage due to 
the inter-connected nature of the electricity markets, it is limited in scope, lack of safety-valve 
mechanism, and limits to the number and geographic origin of offsets.69  
Quebec's cap-and-trade system applies to multiple points of regulation to enable broad 
coverage. The regime auctions off most permits, with the exception of 27% allocated for free. 
The number of free permits is scheduled to decline by 1-2% annually. It is linked to the WCI, so 
trading of emissions credits currently occurs between firms in Quebec and California. As of 
February 2015, the price of permits in the joint Califonia-Quebec auction was $15.14 per tonne 
CO2e -- only slightly above the price floor of $15. Quebec's floor price will rise by 5% (plus 
inflation) per year, and the emissions cap will fall by 3-4% annually, thus becoming more 
stringent over time.70 Quebec's system has both upstream and downstream regulation. It covers 
upstream carbon content of fuels and electricity, as well as downstream industrial processes and 
electricity generation emissions above a 25,000 tCO2e threshold. It includes fuel distributer and 
importers beginning in 2015. This correlates to about 85% of Quebec's total emissions.71 Quebec 
is the only jurisdiction in Canada that covers non-combustion process emissions, and achieves 
                                                          
67 Aldy, supra note 13 at 11. 
68 Ibid at 11-12. 
69 Ibid at 12. 
70 Ecofiscal Commission, supra note 20 at 35. 
71 Ibid at 42. 
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the highest coverage of the three Canadian carbon pricing policies currently running.72 Quebec 
allows the use of offsets to a maximum of 8% of compliance, in projects such as manure storage 
facilities, waste disposal sites, and ozone-depleting substances projects.73 Only offset projects 
that take place in California or Quebec are allowed for compliance reporting.74 The revenues that 
are generated from the auctions are used mostly to support emissions reductions in the 
transportation sector, but also support technology and other emissions-reducing projects.75 It is 
too early in the implementation period to discuss how effective this policy has been at reducing 
emissions. 
C. Offsets in Ontario 
California and Quebec both currently only allow for a maximum of 8% of the reductions 
needed for a particular business76 and the WCI has released lengthy guidelines for the offsets 
system.77 These guidelines are meant to offer design recommendations for the WCI offset system 
to WCI Partner jurisdictions. Under these guidelines, an offset certificate is a compliance 
instrument that is awarded by the program authority in the partner jurisdiction under the 
jurisdiction’s cap-and-trade program to the sponsor of a greenhouse gas offset project. An offset 
certificate represents a reduction or removal of one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, 
and the project must meet the criterial for reductions and removals to be real, additional, 
permanent, and verifiable. Reductions and removals must also be clearly owned, adhere to 
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recommended protocols, and result from a project located in a qualifying geographic area. I will 
examine some of these criteria in more detail. 
The requirement that greenhouse gas reductions and removals must be clearly owned is 
important because reporting requirements and other responsibilities related to the maintenance of 
the offset certification must fall to a specific entity. Disputes about ownership of the offset 
certification could delay registration of the offset. Therefore, it is especially important to define 
early on who retains the rights to carbon credits or how rights will be apportioned.78 
The requirement that offsets be “real” ensure that the reduction or removal of CO2e 
results from a clearly identified action or decision, and it must be quantified using accurate and 
conservative methodologies that appropriately account for all relevant greenhouse gas sources 
and sinks and leakage risks.79 The reductions or removals must take place at sources controlled 
by the project proponent. The quantification must be done in a reliable and repeatable manner 
that is appropriate to the GHG source or sink, current at the time of quantification, consider local 
conditions whenever applicable, and account for uncertainty. Quantification methodologies and 
measurement techniques shall set standards for acceptable statistical precision and be based on 
the best available science. When uncertainty is above the defined threshold, it must apply the 
principle of conservativeness which means that quantification methods should use more 
conservative quantification parameters, assumptions, and measurement techniques that minimize 
the risk of overestimating emission reductions and removals credited for a given project. 
To address leakage, the protocol must provide a quantitative assessment of leakage 
whenever possible, and when it is not feasible, a qualitative risk assessment will determine 
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whether the risk of systematic leakage is significant or not. The protocol must also include a 
threshold to identify significant leakage.80 
In order for an offset project to qualify as additional under the WCI guidelines, it must 
represent an emission reduction or removal that would not have happened under a baseline 
scenario.81 The baseline must reflect conservative assumptions that are consistent across all WCI 
Partner jurisdictions. When possible, the baseline will be set using a sector-specific or activity-
specific performance standard which is set in offset protocols based on a regional assessment of 
project performance or common practice. When it is not possible to set a baseline using a 
performance standard, a project-specific baseline may be used. 
An offset will be considered permanent if either the reductions or removals are not 
reversible, or if the reductions or removals are reversed, the project developer must either replace 
the certificates representing reversed reductions with other compliance units from within the 
system or return certificates that were issued to the project.82 The project shall follow or establish 
effective monitoring systems, risk mitigation approaches, and contingency plans that address 
how, in the event of an intentional or negligent reversal, any affected offset certificates will be 
replaced. WCI Partner jurisdictions must establish mechanisms to address reversals that are not 
the result of intention or negligence and where proponents’ contingency measures prove 
inadequate. Sequestration projects must be designed so that the net atmospheric effect of their 
greenhouse gas removal is comparable to the atmospheric effect achieved by non-sequestration 
projects. The standard currently set by the UNFCCC is currently set at a sequestration timeline of 
100 years.83 
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Finally, the WCI guidelines for offsets require that a greenhouse gas reduction or removal 
must be verifiable. This means that the reduction or removal must be well documented and 
transparent, such that an independent and qualified verifier can review the offset.84 
The cap-and-trade program design options released by the Ontario government in 
November of 2015 contained a number of proposals for its own carbon offset market, though it 
contains much less specificity than the WCI guidelines at this stage. Offset credits within Ontario 
would recognize real, additional, enforceable, verifiable, permanent reductions, and they “may 
produce co-benefits including health, social, and benefits in addition to greenhouse gas 
reductions.”85 The proposal explained that the WCI recommended limiting the use of offsets for 
compliance of an individual firm to 8% so that offsets represent no more than 49% of emission 
reductions needed to achieve the cap, which amounted to 4% of the overall emissions cap.86 The 
limit of 4% was increased to 8% to account for the fact that some of the allowances under the 
cap had been diverted to create the strategic reserve.87 The Ontario government proposed to 
establish an offset credit registry, issue offset credits for emissions reductions and removals from 
eligible projects within Canada, recognize offset credits issued by California and Quebec, in 
anticipation of linking to Ontario’s program, and to adopt the WCI recommendation to limit the 
use of offsets to up to 8% of the total compliance obligation.88 The emissions reductions and 
removals would be quantified using an Ontario-approved offset protocol that sets out the 
requirements with respect to the criteria of being real, additional, verifiable, validated, 
enforceable, and permanent.89 Ontario and Quebec are contracting through a request for bids 
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process for the adaptation of existing protocols for use in Canada.90 Three protocols have been 
adopted for use in Quebec and/or California and will be evaluated for adaptation to the Ontario 
system on an expedited basis: mine methane capture and destruction, landfill gas capture and 
destruction, and ozone depleting substances capture and destruction. A further ten project types 
will be subject to a more comprehensive development process: N2O reductions from fertilizer 
management in agriculture, emission reductions from livestock, organic waste digestion, organic 
waste management, forest project, afforestation, urban forest project, grassland, conservation 
cropping, and refrigeration systems.91 
D. Ability of Ontario’s North to fit within the Offset Regime 
 Although the protocols for land-based projects that could occur in Northern Ontario have 
not yet been developed, there is reason to expect that the protocols will be applicable. As 
mentioned above, Ontario is already contemplating the use of forest projects and afforestation. 
The arguments with respect to treaty rights will be most applicable to land-based projects, such 
that they can be attached to the ecosystem services of the traditional territory. 
 The Offset Committee of the Western Climate Initiative released a review that identifies 
how well existing protocols satisfy the WCI criteria, so that they could concentrate on 
modifications to existing protocols for priority project types, which were determined to be 
agriculture, forestry, and waste management.92 The WCI contracted Det Norske Veritas, 
following a competitive and open RFP process, to evaluate the existing offset protocols. The 
evaluation found that there are protocols for afforestation and reforestation, forest management, 
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and forest preservation and conservation that are likely to meet the requirements of the WCI 
Guidelines with some modifications.93 Therefore it is likely that the Ontario government will 
find that the forest projects that are being contemplated94 will be able to fit within the 
requirements of the WCI Offset Guidelines. These types of land-based projects will be the 
simplest to endorse as an exercise of a treaty right to carbon sequestration, since treaty rights are 
typically territory-based. They also might be the most likely types of projects for First Nations to 
be able to make use of traditional ecological knowledge and activities that are in line with many 
First Nations’ belief systems. Therefore, forestry-based projects are what are contemplated for 
the legal analysis below.  
 It is unfortunate that there seems to be no place for peatland sequestration in Ontario’s 
proposal. This is likely due to the lack of understanding surrounding the measurement of 
baseline carbon storage across peatlands. One of the proposals contained in Ontario’s Climate 
Change Strategy Report is that by 2030, “we will have improved our understanding of the roles 
of forests, peatlands, wetlands and grasslands in climate change mitigation and adaptation. This 
knowledge will enable us to manage our lands in a sustainable way and design green 
infrastructure in the built environment to better support the absorption and storage of carbon.”95 
There is some scientific literature on this topic within the contexts of both Ontario and the UK,96 
but it is my understanding that there are no offset protocols that would be applicable to peatland 
restoration and conservation. 
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II. Treaty Rights in Ontario 
 Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the “existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”97 These rights 
can exist in three forms. In R v Van der Peet, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the right 
to “practices, customs and traditions” that can be proven as “integral to distinctive cultures”98. 
These are sometimes called “aboriginal rights”. Second, treaty rights are those that have been 
defined in a negotiated agreement between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, such as in Treaty 
9, which covers most of Northern Ontario. Finally, aboriginal title to land was recognized as a 
type of aboriginal right in Delgamuukw v British Columbia.99 If an aboriginal group has a 
recognized right, they must meet legal tests to challenge government infringements of those 
rights.   
  If the right is affirmed, the Court will look to whether the infringement can be justified 
according to the test in Sparrow.100 In determining whether an interference has occurred, the 
Court considers whether the limitation is reasonable, whether it causes undue hardship, and 
whether it denies the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising it. Then the court 
moves on to the justification analysis by determining if there is a valid legislative objective, and 
whether the Crown has upheld its fiduciary duty, and the honour of the Crown. Considerations 
might include whether the infringement was as minimal as possible, whether priority was given 
to the aboriginal right, whether the aboriginal group was consulted, and whether there was fair 
compensation.  
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For the purpose of this paper, aboriginal title will not be discussed, because most of 
Ontario is covered by treaties that surrender aboriginal title. I will also examine whether 
aboriginal rights are in play in Ontario, but I conclude that they have also been ceded by the 
specific treaties that are relevant in Northern Ontario. I will focus my analysis on treaty rights 
after outlining the ongoing overarching obligations that typically arise in Ontario. 
A. Honour of the Crown 
 It is important to note the principle of the “honour of the Crown” because it underlies all 
of the Crown’s interactions with aboriginal people, and many, if not all, of the legal obligations 
that the Supreme Court of Canada has placed on the Crown are said to flow from this principle. 
The honour of the Crown requires the Crown to act honourably in its dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples.101 The concept was discussed at length in Haida, 102 and has been called a 
“constitutional principle.103 The Supreme Court of Canada stated in Haida that “[i]n all its 
dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims 
and the implementation of treaties, the Crown must act honourably”.104 Although Haida was not 
a treaty case, McLachlin CJ pointed out that “The honour of the Crown also infuses the process 
of treaty making and treaty interpretation. In making and applying treaties, the Crown must act 
with honour and integrity, avoiding even the appearance of “sharp dealing”.”105 The ultimate 
purpose of the honour of the Crown is the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal societies with 
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the assertion of Crown Sovereignty.106 This statement of the ultimate purpose of the honour of 
the Crown has been made over and over again in the Supreme Court judgements.107 
 The obligation to act honourably is one that is explicitly owed to an Aboriginal group. It 
will not be engaged by a constitutional obligation in which Aboriginal peoples simply have a 
strong interest, or by a constitutional obligation owed to a group partially composed of 
Aboriginal peoples. A constitutional obligation explicitly directed at an Aboriginal group 
invokes its “special relationship” with the Crown.108 In the case of Ontario, this constitutional 
obligation arises through the treaty that applies to a specific group or groups of First Nations. 
 It is noted in Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General) that the 
honour of the Crown is not a cause of action in itself, but it speaks to “how obligations that 
attract it must be fulfilled”.109 In certain cases, the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary 
duty, a duty to consult, or a duty of diligent fulfillment and informs treaty interpretation and 
treaty implementation.110 However, this is not an exhaustive list of duties that might arise under 
the honour of the Crown.111 
B. Duty to Consult 
 In Haida, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed and expanded on the duty to consult, 
which is required by the honour of the Crown in certain circumstances.112 The duty arises when 
the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of an Aboriginal right 
                                                          
106 Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 at para 66 [Manitoba Metis]. 
107 See for example, Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 
74 at para 24; Van der Peet, supra note 98 at para 248; Haida, supra note 7 at para 25; Little Salmon, supra note 103 
at para 62; Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005), 29 SCLR (2d) 433 at 436. 
108 Manitoba Metis, supra note 106 at para 72. 
109 Ibid at para 73. 
110 Ibid at para 73. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Haida, supra note 7. 
27 
 
or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.113 It is helpful that in Rio Tinto 
Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, the Court commented that the type of conduct that 
can trigger a duty to consult is “not confined to decisions or conduct which have an immediate 
impact on lands and resources…[A] potential for adverse impact suffices”.114 It includes 
“strategic, higher level decisions” with potential impacts on rights.115 The higher level decisions 
that require a duty to consult could include decisions relating to Ontario’s cap-and-trade system, 
offset system, or land use issues. Another requirement for the trigger of the duty to consult is that 
the potential adverse effects on the exercise of a given Aboriginal interest must be 
“appreciable…mere speculative impacts” will not suffice.116  
The content of the duty to consult depends on the circumstances. In general, the scope of 
the duty is proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the 
existence of the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the 
right or title claimed.117 There is no duty to agree, but there must be a commitment to meaningful 
consultation, and both sides must act in good faith. Good faith consultation may reveal a duty to 
accommodate. This is not to say that Aboriginal groups have a veto over what can be done by the 
Crown – even in the case of established rights, the Crown does not necessarily need consent 
from the affected Aboriginal group. However, the Crown does need to show an effort to address 
the group’s concerns. The Crown is permitted to balance any accommodation against other 
societal interests, but must maintain the emphasis on compromise and reconciliation.118  
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In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the duty to consult in situations where 
the Crown relies on the “taking up” clause in the numbered treaties to remove lands from the 
scope of treaty hunting and fishing rights.119 “The honour of the Crown infuses every treaty right 
and the performance of every treaty obligation. Treaty 8 therefore gives rise to Mikisew 
procedural rights (e.g. consultation) as well as substantive rights (e.g. hunting, fishing and 
trapping rights).”120 This means that Ontario must consult before engaging in any resource 
development on treaty land, and I would submit, this includes the ecosystem service of carbon 
sequestration. This means that the government of Ontario may be required to consult First 
Nations communities on the development of some of their forthcoming offset protocols because 
they could adversely impact First Nations rights to carbon on their territories. At the very least, 
even if the right to control carbon offsets is rejected, the government must still consult First 
Nations regarding offsets and cap-and-trade more generally, because the program has the 
potential to adversely impact the enumerated treaty harvesting rights. However, the duty to 
consult is certainly a lesser form of protection than many of the other duties discussed in this 
paper. It doesn’t require consent or accommodation, and doesn’t give rise to any substantive 
rights. Therefore, though consultation is a major focus of the Ontario government, and is likely 
to play a role in the development of the cap-and-trade offset scheme, it will not be helpful to the 
assertion and confirmation of a right to ownership over the carbon sequestration on traditional 
territories.  
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C. Duty of Diligent Fulfillment 
 The recent case of Manitoba Metis expanded the scope of duties emanating from the 
honour of the Crown.121 It can be seen as another description of the application of the honour of 
the Crown, and reminds the Crown that the scope of this “honour” is not limited to the duties that 
have already been recognized by the Court. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the obligation contained in the Manitoba Act, 1870 did not impose a fiduciary duty on the 
Crown, but it did engage the honour of the Crown. The majority notes that “when the issue is the 
implementation of a constitutional obligation to an Aboriginal people, the honour of the Crown 
requires that the Crown: (1) takes a broad purposive approach to the interpretation of the 
promise; and (2) acts diligently to fulfill it.”122 The first requirement ensures that the 
interpretation of the relevant provision “cannot be a legalistic one that divorces the words from 
their purpose,”123 and it is not controversial. This type of purposive interpretation has long been 
recognized as flowing from the honour of the Crown, and the majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada noted several other cases that have mentioned this requirement.124 The second 
requirement ensures that the Crown act diligently in “pursuit of its solemn obligations and the 
honourable reconciliation of Crown and Aboriginal interests”.125 In order to fulfill this duty, the 
“Crown servants must seek to perform the obligation in a way that pursues the purpose behind 
the promise”.126  
The majority judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada performs some strategic 
analysis to demonstrate that, despite the dissenting opinion, this duty is in fact “not a novel 
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addition to the law”.127 The court asserted that this duty has already arisen in the treaty context in 
Mikisew Cree First Nation, and in Little Salmon, where the Crown’s honour is assured by 
diligently carrying out its promises.128 Further, the court notes that in Haida, the law assumes 
that the Crown always intends to fulfill its solemn promises, including constitutional obligations. 
The Supreme Court asserts that it is logical that if the honour of the Crown is pledged to the 
fulfillment of its obligations, then the honour of the Crown requires the Crown to endeavour to 
ensure its obligations are fulfilled.129 The court pointed out the explicit mention of due diligence 
in Quebec (Attorney General) v Moses, where it was stated that in review proceedings under the 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, the participants are expected to “carry out their 
work with due diligence”.130 The majority then added that the duty applies whether the 
obligation arises in a treaty, or in the Constitution.131  
 The court is also careful to point out that “not every mistake or negligent act in 
implementing a constitutional obligation to an Aboriginal people” is dishonourable.132 However, 
“a persistent pattern of errors and indifference that substantially frustrates the purposes of a 
solemn promise may amount to a betrayal of the Crown’s duty to act honourably in fulfilling its 
promise.”133 Also, it’s not a substantive duty. There is no guarantee that the diligent efforts will 
achieve the fulfillment of a promise. 
 While the duty of diligent fulfillment discussed in Manitoba Metis may not be a novel 
addition to the law, the case does bolster the established principles of treaty interpretation, 
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discussed in more detail below. It also opens the argument that the Crown’s diligent efforts to 
fulfill the treaty promises should include proactively trying to determine whether there is a treaty 
right to the carbon on traditional territories. The government of Ontario might not be considered 
by the courts to be upholding the honour of the Crown if it waits for a claim of infringement 
before examining this issue. 
D. Treaty Rights 
Principles of Treaty Interpretation 
 The principles of treaty interpretation that must be used when examining historical 
treaties reflect “the fact that the Crown enjoyed a superior bargaining position when negotiating 
treaties with native peoples. From the perspective of the Indians, treaties were drawn up in a 
foreign language, and incorporated references to legal concepts of a system of law with which 
the Indians were unfamiliar. In the interpretation of these documents, therefore, it is only just that 
the courts attempt to construe various provisions as the Indians may be taken to have understood 
them.”134 This concept is reiterated by the Supreme Court in Badger: “…any ambiguities or 
doubtful expressions in the wording of the treaty or document must be resolved in favour of the 
Indians. A corollary to this principle is that any limitations which restrict the rights of Indians 
under treaties must be narrowly construed.”135 However, while the language must be construed 
generously, courts may not alter the terms of the treaty by exceeding what “is possible on the 
language” or realistic.136 
The goal in reading historical treaties is not to identify a meeting of the minds as in 
typical contracts, but rather to “choose from among the various possible interpretations of the 
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common intention the one which best reconciles the interests of both parties at the time the treaty 
was signed.”137 In searching for the common intention of the parties, it must be presumed that in 
concluding the treaty, the Crown sought to act honourably.138 In determining the respective 
understandings and intentions of the parties, one must be sensitive to the unique cultural and 
linguistic differences between the parties, and the words of the treaty must be given the meaning 
which they would naturally have held by the parties at the time.139  
Beyond looking at the treaty terms themselves, the court must examine extrinsic 
evidence, such as the immediate historical record, the stated objectives of the Aboriginal parties 
and the Crown; and the political and economic context in which those objectives were 
reconciled.140 “Where a treaty was concluded verbally and afterwards written up by 
representatives of the Crown, it would be unconscionable for the Crown to ignore the oral terms 
while relying on the written terms.”141  
Finally, “treaty rights are not frozen in time”142 but are capable of evolution in response 
to modern circumstances. This involves determining what modern practices are reasonably 
incidental to the core treaty right in its modern context.143  
 There was a debate for many years about whether the provincial governments had the 
authority to “take up lands” for the purposes of the historic treaties.144 The clause that 
enumerates harvesting rights in the treaties typically ends with the phrase, “subject to such 
regulations as may from time to time be made by the government of the country, acting under the 
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authority of His Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up 
from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.”145 The treaties 
that affect lands extending from Ontario through to the Northwest Territories include identical or 
similar provisions, and provinces have relied on them to exploit natural resources in the 
traditional territories of First Nations.146 Shin Imai has argued that the provinces power to “take 
up” treaty lands is not well supported in law.147 This issue has recently been cleared up by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources).148 The 
Court found that Ontario does have the power to take up lands under Treaty 3, and in fact the 
federal government does not.149 The treaty is an agreement between the First Nations and the 
Crown. The level of government that exercises the rights and obligations under the treaty is 
determined by the division of powers in the Constitution.150 The Constitution Act, 1867 gives 
Ontario exclusive authority to take up crown lands in Ontario for forestry, mining, settlement, 
and other exclusively provincial matters.151 The provincial Crown is also bound by the duty to 
exercise its powers in conformity with the honour of the Crown, is subject to fiduciary duties of 
the Crown in dealing with Aboriginal interests, and any taking up of land must meet the 
conditions set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mikisew.152 That is, the province has a 
duty to consult with Aboriginal people and possibly accommodate their concerns, and the 
province is subject to the burden to prove any infringement is “justifiable.” 
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Specific Treaty Provisions: Hunt, fish, and trap 
 In many cases, certain treaty rights will be obvious on the face of the treaty itself. The 
treaties of Northern Ontario guarantee the rights of the treaty signatories to hunt, fish and trap. 
For example, Treaty 9, which covers the majority of Northern Ontario, states:
And His Majesty the King hereby agrees with the said Indians that they shall 
have the right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing 
throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such 
regulations as may from time to time be made by the government of the country, 
acting under the authority of His Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts 
as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, 
lumbering, trading or other purposes.153
The reports of the treaty commissioners for the numbered treaties indicate that most First 
Nation signatories understood the treaties to mean that their traditional livelihood would be 
secured. For example, regarding the negotiations of hunting and fishing rights, the Treaty 9 
Commissioners reported: 
 Missabay, the recognized chief of the band, then spoke, expressing the fears of 
the Indians that, if they signed the treaty, they would be compelled to reside 
upon the reserve to be set apart for them, and would be deprived of the fishing 
and hunting privileges which they now enjoy. 
 On being informed that their fears in regard to both these matters were 
groundless, as their present manner of making their livelihood would in no way 
be interfered with, the Indians talked the matter over among themselves.154 
 
Commercial Harvesting Rights 
 The historical treaties do not explicitly protect First Nations’ right to harvest game, fish, 
or other resources for a commercial purpose. However, courts have sometimes inferred 
commercial harvesting rights from treaty language and evidence of community practice at the 
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time of the treaty signing. In R v Marshall, the treaty in question had a clause that amounted to a 
promise that the Mi’kmaq would not trade with anyone other than the British. The Mi’kmaq 
were found to have historically “sustained themselves in part by harvesting and trading fish 
(including eels) since Europeans first visited the coasts of what is now Nova Scotia in the 16th 
century... What is plain from the pre-Confederation period is that the Indian fishermen were 
encouraged to engage in their occupation and to do so for both food and barter purposes.”155 
Because the community had traded fish at the time of the treaties, the majority of the Supreme 
Court concluded that the community would be allowed to engage in traditional trade activities so 
as to obtain a moderate livelihood, and since Marshall was engaged in selling eels, this could be 
characterized as a traditional activity.156  
In R v Marshall; R v Bernard, the claimants relied on this interpretation of commercial 
activity and commenced logging activities on Crown lands in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
without authorization.157 They argued that they used forest products for a number of purposes at 
the time of the treaties, including housing, heat, sleds, snowshoes, and occasionally traded 
products made of wood to sustain themselves. They argued that Marshall I and Marshall II 
confer a general right to harvest and sell all natural resources which they used to support 
themselves in 1760 – whether for trade or for their own needs. The Court, however, agreed with 
the Crown, that the ruling in Marshall I was based on fishing for trade as a traditional practice of 
1760, and therefore the treaty conferred a right to continue to obtain a moderate livelihood 
through the traditional Mi’kmaq activity of trading fish, and not trading any other item they 
hadn’t traditionally traded. McLachlin states that while treaty rights are not frozen in time, the 
                                                          
155 Marshall I, supra note 9 at para 2, and at para 25 quoting Dickson J. in Jack v The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 294 at 
311. 
156 Ibid. 
157 R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43. 
36 
 
modern activity should represent a logical evolution from the traditional trading activity at the 
time the treaty was made – meaning “the same sort of activity, carried on in the modern 
economy by modern means”158 She states that the activity must be essentially the same. "While 
treaty rights are capable of evolution within limits, ... their subject matter ... cannot be wholly 
transformed."159 Therefore the question was “whether the logging here at issue is the logical 
evolution of a traditional Mi’kmaq trade activity, in the way modern eel fishing was found to be 
a logical evolution of a traditional trade activity of the Mi’kmaq in Marshall I.”160 The court 
found that trade in wood products was not analogous to logging, and that logging was not a 
traditional activity of the Mi’kmaq. In the case of a right to “trade” carbon sequestration for the 
purpose of creating carbon offsets, there would likely be no space for a similar attack, because 
the First Nations in Ontario may be able to demonstrate that they historically did manage the 
lands such that it sustainably sequesters carbon.  
 In R v Horseman dealt with the right to hunt for the purposes of commerce in Treaty 8, 
which includes an identical provision on hunting, fishing and trapping to Treaty 9. The majority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada found that “the original treaty right clearly included hunting for 
purposes of commerce.”161 This was affirmed in Badger,162 although both cases found that the 
right to commercial hunting was extinguished by the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement of 
1930, which does not affect Ontario. Therefore, in Ontario, Treaty 9 would be found to uphold 
the right to commercial hunting. 
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 Indeed, in examining the notes of the Treaty Commissioners for Treaty 9, it is clear that 
hunting for the purposes of commerce were to be included in the right to hunt. They write about 
a conversation with an aboriginal man they referred to as “Yesno”, where they explicitly tell him 
that their traditional harvesting activities should still provide lucrative sources of revenue:  
Yesno had evidently travelled, and had gathered an erroneous and exaggerated 
idea of what the government was doing for Indians in other parts of the country, 
but, as the undersigned wished to guard carefully against any misconception or 
against making any promises which were not written in the treaty itself, it was 
explained that none of these issues were to be made, as the band could not hope to 
depend upon agriculture as a means of subsistence; that hunting and fishing, in 
which occupations they were not to be interfered with, should for very many years 
prove lucrative sources of revenue.163  
The phrase “lucrative sources of revenue” implies that the occupations would provide more than 
one would require for sustenance. This can be interpreted to mean that any benefit from the 
treaty rights under Treaty 9 can be protected even if it is exercised for a commercial benefit. 
 If modern carbon sequestration activities can be found to be a logical evolution of the 
historic forest management practices of First Nations in Ontario, the commercial nature of the 
cap-and-trade system will not prevent the practice from being upheld as a treaty right. Courts 
have generally found the relevant numbered treaties to protect the right to harvest for 
commercial purposes. 
Right to Conservation 
 The Ontario Court of Appeal has opined on the question of conservation within treaty 
rights. In R v Shipman, the court was dealing with the question of whether a member of the 
Walpole Island First Nation can rely on the sharing of hunting rights by a Robinson-Superior 
Treaty signatory while hunting in the Robinson-Superior territory. The Court of Appeal held that 
the rights holders of the treaty could, in theory, share their hunting rights by giving permission to 
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non-rights holders, based on their traditional custom of sharing. However, the particular facts of 
that case did not involve appropriate permission and therefore Mr. Shipman’s convictions were 
upheld. In explaining why the permission must be more specific and recent than was the 
circumstance here, the court noted that “in Aboriginal custom, protection and conservation of 
harvesting resources is paramount and it would be unusual if this was not reflected in the 
granting of consent to share in it.”164 While this does not grant a right to conservation 
specifically, it is a good example of judicial notice of the importance of conservation to the 
exercise of rights and the traditional nature of the protection of the environment. 
 Another example of judicial notice of the importance of the ecosystem to treaty rights 
occurred in Halfway River First Nation v British Columbia (Ministry of Forests).165 The case 
arose in the context of Treaty 8, in an application to quash a forest cutting permit on the First 
Nation’s traditional territory. While the Court did not explicitly consider whether treaty rights to 
hunt, fish and trap included an implicit right to conservation, it did accept without question that 
the destruction of the forest at issue would result in the infringement of treaty rights to harvest. 
This limits the ability of the Crown to justify the destruction of ecosystems on which protected 
resource activities rely.166 
 Finally, although Mikisew Cree was ultimately decided on based on the duty to consult, it 
is a clear recognition of the conservation dimension of treaty rights to hunt, fish, and trap.167 The 
Court stated that it is apparent that the proposed road would adversely affect Mikisew hunting 
and trapping rights, due to a decline in the quantity and quality of wildlife harvest for reasons 
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such as fragmentation of wildlife habitat, disruption of migration patterns, loss of vegetation, 
increased poaching because of easier motor vehicle access to the area, and increased wildlife 
mortality due to motor vehicle collisions.168 
 The implicit right to conservation will inform one of the arguments I suggest below for 
asserting a right to ownership of the carbon offsets on traditional territories in Ontario. The right 
to conservation could potentially lead to a requirement that First Nations be involved in land use 
planning and sustainability practices. This activity could then result in a right to the carbon that 
First Nations are helping to sequester. 
Incidental Rights 
 According to the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Simon, “the right to hunt to be 
effective must embody those activities reasonably incidental to the act of hunting itself, an 
example of which is travelling with the requisite hunting equipment to the hunting grounds.”169 
Mr. Simon had been charged with illegal possession of a rifle and ammunition upon a road 
passing through or by a forest, wood or resort of moose or deer contrary to s 150(1) of the Lands 
and Forests Act. The Court simply stated without discussion that it is implicit in the right granted 
by the Treaty that the appellant has the right to possess a gun and ammunition in a safe manner 
in order to be able to exercise the right to hunt.170  
 In R v Sundown, the Supreme Court of Canada elucidated the test set up in R v Simon:  
How should the term "reasonably incidental" be defined and applied? In my view 
it should be approached in this manner. Would a reasonable person, fully apprised 
of the relevant manner of hunting or fishing, consider the activity in question 
reasonably related to the act of hunting or fishing? It may seem old fashioned to 
apply a reasonable person test but I believe it is both useful and appropriate.”171  
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The case involved an individual whose community is a party to Treaty 6 by adhesion. Mr. 
Sundown is entitled to hunt for food on crown land, and cut down trees to build a cabin in 
Meadow Lake Provincial Park without Crown consent, contrary to The Parks Regulations, 1991.  
He testified that he needed the cabin both for shelter and as a place to smoke fish and meat and 
to skin pelts. Evidence was presented at trial that showed a long-standing Band practice to 
conduct extended expedition hunts in the area using shelters at the hunting sites – originally they 
were lean-tos covered with moss, and later tents and log cabins. The Court stated that the test’s 
focus  
…is not upon the abstract question of whether a particular activity is “essential” in 
order for hunting to be possible but rather upon the concrete question of whether 
the activity was understood in the past and is understood today as significantly 
connected to hunting. Incidental activities are not only those which are essential, 
or integral, but include, more broadly, activities which are meaningfully related or 
linked.172  
 
The Court found that some form of shelter is reasonably incidental to Mr. Sundown’s method of 
hunting, and the permanency of the shelter did not make a difference in this case. 
 The right to construct a cabin as an incidental right to the right to hunt was also affirmed 
in the context of Treaty 9.173 However, the court in this case made particular reference to the fact 
that the cabin was built for personal use, and not for a commercial use. Presumably, this is 
because if the cabin was built for the purpose of renting out to people who are not treaty 
signatories, the defendants would not have been able to establish that they were exercising their 
treaty rights. That is, the issue with “commercial use” was with the use of the cabin, not with 
whether the proceeds of the hunt would have been sold commercially versus consumed by the 
First Nation community. 
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 The existence of incidental rights will be helpful to the argument that carbon 
sequestration practices should be protected as a treaty right. Carbon sequestration could be found 
to be reasonably incidental to the practice of the enumerated harvesting rights, meaning that it 
would be protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution, and the honour of the Crown. 
E. Aboriginal Rights 
 The presence of a treaty or a treaty right does not necessarily preclude the existence of an 
Aboriginal right. One example of this proposition can be found in R v Sappier.174 The Supreme 
Court of Canada in that case held that an aboriginal community in New Brunswick had an 
aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic use. Although the Court of Appeal had found that 
the community held both an aboriginal right and treaty right to harvest timber for personal use,175 
the Supreme Court of Canada stated that having found an aboriginal right, it was not necessary to 
comment on the existence of the treaty right.176 This implies that the potential existence of a 
treaty or a treaty right does not interfere with the claim to an aboriginal right.  
 More recently, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the Kwakiutl First Nation 
should be consulted based not only on their treaty rights, but also their claims to aboriginal right 
and title.177 The crown could not meet the duty to consult by consulting only about treaty rights. 
Again, the existence of a treaty did not preclude the existence of aboriginal rights. 
 Unfortunately, the jurisprudence is not absolutely consistent on this point. In the context 
of the Robinson-Huron Treaty, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to examine the nature of an 
aboriginal right because  
Whatever may have been the situation upon the signing of the Robinson-Huron 
Treaty, that right was in any event surrendered by arrangements subsequent to that 
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treaty by which the Indians adhered to the treaty in exchange for treaty annuities 
and a reserve. It is conceded that the Crown has failed to comply with some of the 
obligations under this agreement … It does not alter the fact, however, that the 
aboriginal right has been extinguished.178  
The Court does not go on to explain the nature of that surrender.  
 Also, in discussing what kind of justification would be required for the taking up of lands 
in Treaty 8, the Supreme Court of Canada stated,  
In Sparrow, it will be remembered, the federal government's fisheries regulations 
infringed the aboriginal fishing right, and had to be strictly justified. This is not 
the same situation as we have here, where the aboriginal rights have been 
surrendered and extinguished, and the Treaty 8 rights are expressly limited to 
lands not “required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, 
lumbering, trading or other purposes.”179  
The Court expressly states that aboriginal rights were surrendered and extinguished in Treaty 8.  
 These judgements can be reconciled by examining the treaty language in each situation. 
The language in the treaties involved in Sappier and Chartrand do not specifically deal with the 
cession of rights. The treaty at issue in Sappier was a Peace and Friendship Treaty, and did not 
involve the surrender of rights, lands, or resources.180 In Chartrand, the one of the Douglas 
Treaties was at issue, which included the surrender of land.181 They do not surrender rights or 
interests in the land – only the land itself – and they specifically uphold some of their aboriginal 
rights.182 In contrast, the language in the Robinson-Huron Treaty at issue in Bear Island includes 
that the aboriginal signatories “hereby fully, freely, and voluntarily surrender, cede, grant, and 
convey unto Her Majesty, her heirs and successors for ever, all their right, title, and interest to, 
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and in the whole of, the territory above described…” (emphasis added.)183 Similarly, Treaty 8 
has a clause reading “…the said Indians DO HEREBY CEDE, RELEASE, SURRENDER AND 
YIELD UP to the Government of the Dominion of Canada, for Her Majesty the Queen and Her 
successors for ever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever, to the lands included within 
the following limits…” (emphasis in original)184 The cession of all rights, titles and privileges to 
the land seems to have been understood by the Court in Mikisew to extinguish all aboriginal 
rights not mentioned in the treaty. The language in Treaty 9, at issue in Northern Ontario, is 
identical to the language in Treaty 8.185 Therefore, it is likely that a court would interpret the 
First Nation signatories to Treaty 9 to have surrendered their aboriginal rights through the treaty, 
or at least their aboriginal rights that have a connection to land. One assumption in my position is 
that the carbon sequestration that is most likely to be engaged in in Northern Ontario is 
connected to the land itself. For the purposes of this paper, I will not examine aboriginal rights 
because the treaties in Ontario will be interpreted by the courts as extinguishing aboriginal rights 
based in land beyond those that can be described as treaty rights. 
F. Imposition of Positive Obligations 
 One of the challenges to this types of claim is the question of whether the state protection 
of section 35(1) rights can give rise to positive obligations. The arguments here would require 
the provincial government to act in that the ownership of ecosystem services would need to be 
recognized either explicitly or implicitly in the cap-and-trade regulations, especially when taking 
into account the duty of diligent fulfillment. 
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 In Haida, the Court stated that section 35(1) obligations are highly context specific and 
that the “honour of the Crown gives rise to different duties in different circumstances”.186 The 
Court in Haida noted that “the controlling question in all situations is what is required to 
maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation”.187 Although the scholarly work 
and jurisprudence is limited on this issue, it has been suggested that Crown obligations arise 
when honour, in a very practical sense, requires them to arise, when their absence would 
undermine the possibility of rights being meaningfully reconciled with Crown sovereignty.188  
 Beyond the principles stated above with respect to the question of whether inaction can 
be subject to judicial scrutiny, there are also specific cases where a minister’s decision not to 
take action has been ruled to be a violation of either the fiduciary duty, or more generally, the 
honour of the Crown. In Adam v Canada (Environment), the failure to avert threats to a declining 
caribou population was found to be in violation of the honour of the Crown due to the First 
Nation’s right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting and fishing.189 In Union of Nova Scotia 
Indians v Canada (Attorney General), the Crown’s failure to consider Aboriginal interests after 
having contracted out the evaluation of the dredging plan of a mining company violated the 
Crown’s fiduciary duty to protect the potentially threatened fishing rights of the Mi’kmaq.190 
However, both of these cases additionally involve federal legislation such as the Species at Risk 
Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, which in themselves create positive 
obligations, though not necessarily in relation to First Nations. Justice Strayer of the Federal 
Court has even mentioned in obiter that the Crown’s fiduciary duty may require the government 
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to enact legislation, in light of the decision in Guerin.191 Therefore, the general principle that the 
Crown’s failure to act is not actionable in court may become more flexible.  
 With respect to the implementation of the treaties, the arguments relating to the honour of 
the Crown are still in play, but there is an added element of the duty of diligent fulfillment 
enumerated in Manitoba Metis.192 It is unclear at this point whether Manitoba Metis has in fact 
created a positive duty, but it does require that the Crown pursues its constitutional obligations 
with diligence, so it seems to imply that a positive obligation can arise in the circumstance of 
upholding treaty rights. 
III. Proposals for Aboriginal Carbon Offset Rights in the Ontario Context 
Every claim to a treaty right to enjoy the benefits of carbon offsets will have to be argued 
on the specific historical facts surrounding the treaty in question and the community in question. 
However, I have made some cautious generalizations in order to explore the arguments that 
might be useful. 
Before describing the three mechanisms I foresee being potentially useful in 
acknowledging a treaty right to the carbon sequestration capabilities of the traditional territories 
of treaty signatories, it is important to note that when discussing “ownership” in this context, it 
does not refer to ownership in the common law sense of the term. Aboriginal rights have been 
described as “sui generis”. The term has long been used in aboriginal law to describe the unique 
fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.193 And it is also used to 
describe the bundle of rights that come with aboriginal title, which confers proprietary rights that 
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are distinct from a fee simple interest in the land.194 The proposed treaty right to carbon does not 
entail the full sui generis proprietary right that comes with aboriginal title.195 After all, ownership 
of carbon, or the carbon sequestration capacity of an ecosystem is different from a general 
ownership of the trees or a general ownership of the land. The aboriginal right to fish was also 
described as sui generis in Sparrow.196 In Sappier, the Supreme Court noted that “an aboriginal 
right cannot be characterized as a right to a particular resource because to do so would be to treat 
it as akin to a common law property right. In characterizing aboriginal rights as sui generis, this 
Court has rejected the application of traditional common law property concepts to such right.”197 
The Court characterized aboriginal rights as founded in practices, customs, or traditions.198 The 
sui generis nature of aboriginal rights can be extended to treaty rights. It would be impossible to 
argue that treaty rights confer an absolute fee simple ownership of the carbon on their traditional 
territories. This is why it is important to understand that the right being proposed is not a right to 
ownership of the carbon itself, but a right to the carbon sequestration services of the land. The 
details of what this kind of sui generis right would include would likely need to be the subject of 
negotiation. 
Keeping in mind the principles of treaty interpretation described above, I will turn to 
three potential arguments for affirming the treaty right to ownership of carbon on traditional 
lands. The first is as an incidental right to the enumerated treaty rights, the second is framed as a 
right to harvest carbon offsets, and the third is the expansion of the interpretation of the treaties 
to include sharing in the benefits of the land. 
                                                          
194 Delgamuukw, supra note 99. 
195 In accordance with Van der peet, supra note 98 at para 121. 
196 Sparrow, supra note 10 at 68. 
197 Sappier, supra note 174 at 21. 
198 Ibid at 21. 
47 
 
A. An Incidental Right to the Enumerated Treaty Rights 
As described above, some have argued that the right to hunt, fish and trap contains an 
incidental right to the protection of the environment. Without going through the evidence in 
detail in this paper, Patrick Malcklem has presented a strong argument that protection and 
conservation of their environment and its resources was the primary motivating factor for the 
First Nations to sign Treaty 9.199 Due to the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway line in 
their territory and the resulting increase in settlers who were putting pressure on the First 
Nations’ resources, aboriginal groups petitioned for a treaty. Macklem concludes that  
“when one begins to examine the reasons for protecting rights to hunt, fish, and 
trap, it becomes clear that what Aboriginal people were seeking to protect was 
their traditional ways of life from non-Aboriginal erosion…As such, [Treaty 9 
hunting, fishing and trapping rights] ought to be viewed as not only conferring the 
right to engage in the activity listed by the terms of the treaty but also to include 
the right to expect that such activity will continue to be successful, measured by 
reference to the fruits of past practice.”200 
 I believe it is uncontroversial that Treaty 9 harvesting rights include the right to the 
protection of the environment in their traditional territories. Firstly, it falls within the “reasonably 
incidental” test set out by R v Sundown: “Would a reasonable person, fully apprised of the 
relevant manner of hunting or fishing, consider the activity in question reasonably related to the 
act of hunting or fishing?”201 Certainly the existence and protection of the habitat of the animals 
or plants which are the subject of harvesting is included as something that is reasonably related 
to the exercise of harvesting rights. The exercise of these rights depend entirely on the 
conservation of the natural landscape. Secondly, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently 
reiterated the point that if the taking up of land leaves a First Nation with no meaningful right to 
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hunt, fish, or trap in areas over which they traditionally hunted, fished, or trapped, a potential 
action for treaty infringement will arise.202 Therefore, there must be some level of conservation 
of the environment in the treaty signatories’ traditional territory in order for the Crown to even 
purport to be upholding the treaty and the honour of the Crown. Finally, the right to conservation 
has been implicitly recognized by various courts, as discussed above. 
 While it would be quite possible that a right to conservation would be successful in court, 
something more is required in order to arrive at the conclusion that a right to conservation could 
give rise to the ownership of the ecosystem services of carbon sequestration. One way to make 
this leap is to assert that the management of the ecosystem is an incidental right based on the 
harvesting and conservation rights. As discussed above, the test for an incidental right is whether 
a reasonable person, fully apprised of the relevant manner of hunting or fishing, consider the 
activity in question reasonably related to the act of hunting or fishing? It could be argued that the 
exercise of harvesting rights requires conservation, which can only be achieved through 
discussions and learning from First Nations communities on their traditional territories, due to 
the explicit rights to harvesting. If the right to some level of co-management can be affirmed, it 
is possible that this might give rise to some form of ownership over the services that come out of 
this management. It will be important to establish that current environmental management 
practices are rooted in pre-contact practices. Assuming that the management by the First Nations 
communities involved is a good fit with the protocols that are to be set up for forestry projects to 
be included in the cap-and-trade system, it could be asserted that they should be given the right 
to sell the ecosystem services on their traditional territories as offset credits. This argument 
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requires a number of steps, which means that the relationship between hunting, fishing and 
trapping and ownership of carbon sequestration processes could easily be found to be too distant. 
B. A Right to “Harvest Carbon Offsets”? 
 The right to harvest explicitly includes the right to hunt, fish, and trap, as noted above. It 
could be possible to assert treaty rights that are not explicitly mentioned, but fit well enough 
within the category of harvesting that they are not deemed to have been ceded by the Treaty. 
Many First Nations communities would be able to show that they traditionally used wood 
products from the forest in order to build shelter, provide heat, build transportation devices, et 
cetera. If the treaty rights to harvesting are interpreted to mean that the traditional manner of 
making their livelihood would be undisturbed, as the treaty commissioners insisted when 
meeting reluctance from the chief of one of the bands,203 then it may be determined by analogy 
that First Nations have a treaty right to “harvest” sequestration capabilities from the land. If the 
treaty is interpreted broadly, harvesting carbon offsets from the land could be a modern evolution 
of harvesting products from the land for use or sale.  
Also, carbon sequestration specifically is a benefit that was certainly not contemplated by 
either of the parties at the time of the treaty signing, and therefore one could argue that it was not 
ceded by the Treaties. Other forms of resource development, such as mining and lumbering, had 
been enumerated in the treaties as reasons that the Crown might take up land in the future. The 
interest in harvesting on traditional territories could reasonably be argued to give rise to a right 
access the unforeseen “harvest” that may now emanate from the land. 
 Certainly this would be a difficult argument to make. One of the challenges with making 
this argument to a court or even in a negotiation room is that treaty rights to harvest involve 
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rights to benefit from take things off of the land, whereas a treaty right to “harvest” carbon is a 
right to benefit from keeping things in the land. This might be a distinction that is too vast for a 
court to find that these two rights are analogous and arise out of the same provisions of the 
treaty. Others might argue that if you are keeping something in the land, you are inherently not 
“harvesting”. 
 There is an argument to be made regarding the examination of the core of the treaty right 
to determine how it might have evolved or developed into the modern context. For example, the 
Federal Court in Beattie v R dealt with Treaty 11, and the right to “agricultural assistance”, 
which is enumerated in the text of the treaty.204 The judge held that the  
core of the treaty right to agricultural assistance… is the development of a 
capacity for self-sufficiency based on the use of the land base. This could involve 
assistance with different modalities of food production or expanding the definition 
of agriculture to include other renewable resources whose cultivation could be the 
basis of self-sufficiency.205  
Ms. Beattie lost her case because she was asserting rights outside of her traditional territory, so 
the above statement opining about the expansion of the definition of agriculture to include other 
renewable resources was not a necessary component of the judgement. However, this is still a 
helpful statement. The broad interpretation of Treaty 11 in this case suggests that a broad 
interpretation of Treaty 9 could expand treaty rights to hunt, fish and trap to a core right to self-
sufficiency based on the sustainable use of treaty lands.206 In this sense, the harvesting rights set 
out in Treaty 9 could be said to have evolved into the modern right to harvest other resources 
from the land, including carbon sequestration, provided that they are harvested sustainably.  
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 Another challenge to this proposition is that First Nations in Ontario have long been 
frustrated with their lack of access to commercial forestry opportunities, which would be the 
closest analogy to carbon offset opportunities in the context of forestry-related offset projects. At 
the time of contact with Europeans and when most of the treaties in Ontario were signed, 
aboriginal people lived off the resources of the forest. Medicinal plants, berries, wood for fuel, 
shelter, hunting tools, canoes and trade were all harvested from the forest.207 For example, the 
Ojibwe of Northern Ontario were actively involved in selling lumber to non-Aboriginal 
enterprises prior to entering into Treaty 3.208 The Environmental Assessment Board’s 1994 
assessment of forest management on Crown lands in Ontario, concluded that aboriginal 
communities have largely been excluded from the forestry industry as a whole since the treaties 
were signed.209 As a condition of its assessment approval, the Board ordered that MNR District 
Managers negotiate with aboriginal peoples to “implement ways of achieving a more equal 
participation by aboriginal peoples in the benefits” of forest management planning.”210 The 
Board also recommended that Ontario review its timber licensing policy as it relates to 
aboriginal peoples, investigate any barriers to their obtaining timber licenses, and consider what 
remedies may be required.211 Furthermore, the Board recommended that Ontario and Canada do 
“whatever is necessary to conclude various processes under way to define treaty and aboriginal 
rights.”212 However, it appears that Ontario has not established any negotiations to determine the 
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treaty rights of Aboriginal communities in relation to the forestry industry. In the Crown Forest 
Sustainability Act, 1994, the Crown has provided only that the Act not derogate from Aboriginal 
or treaty rights recognized by the Constitution and it permits agreements with First Nations in the 
area of forestry planning.213 The Ministry of Natural Resources has developed a consultation 
program including Aboriginal representatives on forest management planning teams, but they are 
aimed at protecting medicine plants and unique Aboriginal values during timber harvesting, and 
does not address the issue of treaty rights.214 Meanwhile, the Far North Act contains objectives 
for land use planning in the Far North that include: a significant role for First Nations in the 
planning, the protection of areas of cultural value in the Far North, the maintenance of biological 
diversity, ecological processes and ecological functions, including the storage and sequestration 
of carbon in the Far North, and enabling sustainable economic development that benefits the 
First Nations.215 The Act also includes a section delineating a role for First Nations: “First 
Nations may contribute their traditional knowledge and perspectives on protection and 
conservation for the purposes of land use planning under this Act.”216 However, the First Nations 
in Nishnawbe Aski Nation, occupants of the far north, have since asserted that the government of 
Ontario is excluding First Nations from any meaningful involvement in policy discussions on 
carbon storage and carbon credits.217 
 On the other hand, it has recently been reported that the Ontario Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Forestry approached Grassy Narrows and two other First Nations in the area to 
consider taking an active role in forest management planning and operations in the Whisky Jack 
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Forest.218 The parties are negotiating the possibility of the bands assuming responsibility for the 
Sustainable Forestry Licence in the area. This would represent a step towards allowing First 
Nations to have control over the resources in their traditional territory – at least those that are 
related to forestry. 
C. Expanding the Interpretation of Treaties 
A final argument that can be made concerning the treaty right to a ownership of carbon 
sequestration capabilities on the traditional territories in Ontario’s North is related to a broad 
form of treaty interpretation, and is therefore somewhat related to the previous argument. It has 
been argued that the treaties constitute an agreement to share in the benefits of the land219  I will 
not examine this argument in detail because it would go well beyond the jurisprudence as it now 
stands, and would require a extensive examination into the history of Ontario, which would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, there are some challenges to this proposition that 
should be discussed. 
The major challenge to this argument is that the First Nations do not currently have the 
right share in the benefits of any of the resources on their traditional territories. They don’t have 
the right to benefits from extracting minerals, lumber, data, water, et cetera. First Nations do 
sometimes benefit from these projects though Impact Benefit Agreements, or they might 
incorporate a logging company of their own, but they have no recognized right to benefit. 
The question of rights to share in the benefits of the land recently came before the 
Ontario divisional court. The issue was whether the Wabauskang First Nation (WFN) was owed 
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a duty to consult and accommodate in relation to a mining project on their traditional territory.220 
The province of Ontario had delegated the procedural aspects of consultation to the company, 
and there was consultation regarding the rights to hunt and fish. However, WFN argued that they 
had asserted treaty rights to “share in the decisions and benefits of the resources,”221 and that the 
consultations with respect to those rights could not be delegated to the company. The Court 
decided however, that “Treaty 3 makes no express or implied reference to shared decision-
making and revenue sharing.”222 The judgement went on:  
I am not persuaded that Ontario had a duty to consult and accommodate with 
respect to revenue-sharing and shared decision-making. On the record before me, 
I do not accept that WFN had such rights arising from Treaty 3. The evidence 
makes it clear that WFN understood and agreed that the issue of revenue-sharing 
(and shared decision-making) was to be negotiated between WFN and Rubicon. It 
was only at the penultimate moment that WFN took the position that Ontario had 
a duty to consult on those issues. I conclude that WFN’s assertion that Ontario 
failed to consult and accommodate on those issues is without foundation.223 
The Court points to little evidentiary record on the issue of the asserted rights to shared 
decision-making and benefit-sharing. Because of this, it has been suggested that perhaps the First 
Nation attempted to reach for a broad reading of the treaty rights without putting an adequate 
foundation to the court.224 In the Notice of Application for Judicial Review, WFN relied on its 
prima facie claim of their right to hunt and fish under Treaty 3, not on a right to shared decision-
making or benefit-sharing. However, their factum did not address a failed duty to consult and 
accommodate on treaty rights to hunt and fish. In the factum and submissions, WFN suggested 
that Ontario failed to consult on shared decision-making and revenue-sharing. The Court 
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statement that “it was only at the penultimate moment that WFN took the position that Ontario 
had a duty to consult on those issues”225 indicates that the court was of the opinion that WFN had 
come up with this new argument without spending the time to develop a good historical 
grounding for it. It is possible that WFN has pursued the case in a non-strategic way, and that 
this could now negatively impact claims of other first nations on this issue, because the text of 
Treaty 3 is similar to the text of most of the other numbered treaties.226 This case was appealed 
by Wabauskang First Nation, but has since been withdrawn after a settlement with Rubicon 
Minerals Corporation.227 It is perhaps for the best that this case did not go in front of higher 
courts, because it might have hurt the chances of others who could produce the evidentiary 
record to support a similar claim. It is also possible that it would have negatively impacted the 
two arguments made above. 
IV. Conclusion 
Ultimately the arguments proposed here are relatively weak, but they can be used as one 
part of the effort in ensuring that First Nations in Ontario are given the opportunity to benefit 
from the sequestration of carbon on their traditional territory, if not the right to ownership. 
Ultimately this could occur through negotiations and agreements with the provincial government, 
impact benefit agreements, or litigation. It may be that the best way to achieve recognition of this 
right is through negotiation, because it would be less costly and could generate more inventive 
solutions. The parties could then determine the details of what is included in the sui generis 
ownership of carbon. Two approaches that might be considered for the purpose of upholding the 
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potential right are a requirement that offset licences are granted to First Nations projects at no 
cost, or a requirement that projects on traditional territories give equity in the project to First 
Nations in the territory. Certainly there are many other approaches that can be taken by the 
parties that would result in a proper recognition of the treaty rights of First Nations and the 
honour of the Crown more generally.228 
Even if the right to ownership of carbon offsets within a First Nation’s traditional 
territory is affirmed, the Crown is likely to be able to justifiably infringe that right based on the 
public benefit that could come out of the cap-and-trade program. It’s likely that regulating the 
offset market and the rules within it may constitute a reasonable infringement, but exclusion 
from the system would be difficult for the Crown to justify. Assuming that Ontario is trying to 
uphold the honour of the Crown and trying to effect reconciliation, then the arguments contained 
in this paper give them a reason not to ignore or infringe the potential right. 
I have focused mainly on offset projects involving the forestry sector, but given the large 
amount of carbon stored within Ontario’s peatlands, and other potential sequestration projects 
that are less dependent on the land itself, it would be useful for future research to examine 
whether an argument can be made for a variety of types of carbon sequestration. Could these 
arguments extend to other forms of offset projects based on the abstract notion of carbon 
molecules rather than just carbon sequestration capacity within forests? It seems that the 
argument would be difficult to make, but that doesn’t mean that it should not be considered by 
the Ontario government in deciding how the offset system will work within the cap-and-trade 
regime. 
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The arguments that I am proposing here depend completely on any given First Nation’s 
desire and capacity to get involved in the offset market. There is reason to believe that there 
would be considerable interest from First Nations in Ontario. Some First Nations in Canada are 
already implementing projects specifically for the purpose of carbon sequestration, including 
some in Ontario.229 On July 8, 2015, Larry Sault, former Councillor and Chief of the 
Mississaugas of the New Credit and former Grand Chief of the Iroquois and Allied Indians, 
made a speech to the Climate Change Summit of the Americas. I will defer to his own words: 
These two pathways – fighting climate change and revitalizing treaty 
relationships – are now coming together. And that’s a good thing for 
everybody. 
When you’re battling climate change, you need warriors. 
We are those warriors. Our weapons are not guns. We’re armed with wisdom 
and love for the natural world. We are Stewardship Warriors. 
For thousands of years, our communities have been stewards of the complex 
ecological systems that support our wellbeing. We had a thriving culture and a 
sophisticated, sustainable economy with trade routes that reached as far as 
Mexico. 
In our recent history (the last 200 years or so) people have tried to take that role of 
Stewardship away from us. 
Let me be clear – we will never stop being the stewards of our traditional 
territory 
In fact, we are working harder than ever as Stewardship Warriors to protect and 
enhance ecosystems. 
… 
We are deeply committed to being leaders in the fight against climate change. 
Often - that means fighting against the establishment. But we’re also willing to 
fight alongside worthy initiatives. 
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Cap and Trade is a prime example. The Mississaugas of the New Credit First 
Nation will be fully engaged in developing Cap and Trade. AND we expect to use 
our share of the revenues generated to support initiatives and economic 
development by and for our people. 
Our plans for land and water ecosystem stewardship will be based on appropriate 
carbon management and offset strategies. 
We’ll make sure we’re fully compensated for our work protecting, repairing and 
managing ecosystems: historically, today and looking into the next seven 
generations. We all know that proper financial incentive is one of the most 
powerful drivers of positive change. 
We’ll ensure that our people have the tools and training to deal with potentially 
disastrous weather related events and to deal with the long-term ecosystem 
impacts of climate change. 
None of us can do this alone. Effectively combating climate change and managing 
ecosystems will take firm agreements with our First Nation and other Tribal 
Nations throughout North America.230 
Larry Sault is now the CEO of a company called Anwaatin, which is “an indigenous business 
working with Indigenous communities in linked Cap and Trade markets that include Ontario, 
Quebec, Manitoba and California.”231 One of the things this company is working on is an 
Indigenous Carbon Offset certification based on the standards set up by the Western Climate 
Initiative. The Indigenous Offset would include additional certification to verify offsets 
generated on lands stewarded by indigenous peoples and/or via an indigenous partnership with 
private/public/NGO entities. 
 Another example of the desire to learn about and be involved in the offset market is 
represented through the First Nations Carbon Collaborative (FNCC). The FNCC is a community-
driven project that aspires to build capacity within First Nations so they can participate in and 
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benefit from carbon markets.232 The initiative is led by the International Institute of Sustainable 
Development, the Centre for Indigenous Environmental Resources, and three First Nations 
representing the different First Nation governance structures within Canada (Poplar River First 
Nation, Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, and T’licho Nation).233 In 2011, the University of 
Toronto’s Centre for Environment, in collaboration with FNCC, presented a free webinar series 
“to bring together First Nations, carbon specialists, government and environmental groups to 
share information regarding their projects and policies for carbon and emissions trading, science 
and financing.”234 While not representative of all First Nations in Ontario, there is a clear interest 
by some First Nations to fully exercise their treaty rights in the stewardship of the land while 
gaining the economic benefit from the offset market. 
If a sui generis right to ownership of the carbon sequestration capacity of the land is 
recognized and First Nations want to participate in the offset market, it is possible that they will 
require some government support to build up their own capacity. The Government of Ontario 
recently posted to its website a list of ways that it will be spending the “Green Investment Fund”, 
which they are describing as a “down payment on Ontario’s pending Cap-and-Trade 
program.”235 One of the ways the government proposes to spend this money is to support 
indigenous communities. This includes “building technical capacity so Indigenous communities 
are able to take advantage of economic opportunities from Ontario’s proposed cap and trade 
program.”236 It is not immediately clear what is meant by this proposition, but it seems likely that 
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this funding could be used, or perhaps is intended to be used to help First Nations become 
partners in the carbon offset market. Whether or not ownership of the carbon sequestration 
capacity on traditional territory is what is contemplated, this is a step in the right direction. 
 While I have found no clear and obvious treaty right to carbon offsets on traditional 
territories, the recognition of this right by the government of Ontario would constitute a valuable 
step towards reconciliation, and would support the efforts of Ontario to do its part to mitigate 
climate change. The recognition would be about more than managing litigation risk. It would be 
about the benefits that could come to all Ontarians by sharing the work of reducing carbon 
emissions and learning from Traditional Ecological Knowledge. It would be about upholding not 
just the law of the honour of the Crown, but the spirit of it. 
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